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ABSTRACT
We develop a positive theory of the adoption of child labor laws. Workers who compete with children
in the labor market support the introduction of a child labor ban, unless their own working children
provide a large fraction of family income. Since child labor income depends on family size, fertility
decisions lock agents into speciﬁc political preferences, and multiple steady states can arise. The
introduction of child labor laws can be triggered by skill-biased technological change that induces
parents to choose smaller families. The model replicates features of the history of the U.K. in the
nineteenth century, when regulations were introduced after a period of rising wage inequality, and
coincided with rapidly declining fertility rates.
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Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.The aim of this paper is to develop a positive theory of child labor regulations (CLR). In the
current political debate, the need to regulate child labor is often taken for granted: child labor
is portrayed as an evil that ought to be eradicated for humanitarian reasons. From a histori-
cal perspective, however, this view of child labor is of a relatively recent origin. In Western
countries, until the nineteenth century most children worked, and working was generally con-
sidered to be beneﬁcial for children. Much more feared than child labor was its opposite,
idleness of children, which was thought to lead to disorder, crime, and lack of preparation for
a productive working life.1 Opposition to child labor and, ultimately, child labor laws arose
only after the rise of the factory system. CLR were ﬁrst introduced in Britain in the nineteenth
century, and have by now been put into place in all industrialized countries. However, in many
developingcountries child labor continues to be widespread, CLR are either lacking or weakly
enforced, and public support for the introduction of stringent CLR is low.
These observations raise the question of why, in some countries, attitudes towards child labor
shifted over time and led to the adoption of CLR, whereas in other countries child labor con-
tinues to be the accepted norm. In this paper, we argue that a society’s views on child labor
depend on economic incentives. In our theory, the main motive that leads some people to
support CLR is the drive to limit competition: unskilled workers compete with children in the
labor market, and therefore stand to gain from higher wages if child labor is restricted. In this
sense, we regard CLR as similar to other forms of labor regulation. There is, however, a key
feature that distinguishesCLR from labor restrictions aimed at, say, union outsiders or foreign
workers: in the case of child labor, the potential competition comes at least partly from inside
the unskilled workers’ families. For this reason, workers’ attitudes regarding CLR depend not
only on the degree to which they compete with children in the labor market, but also on the
extent to which their family income relies on child labor.
We analyze the implications of this tradeoff for the political economy of CLR within a dy-
namic general equilibrium model. The model economy is populated by overlapping gener-
ations of altruistic agents who choose their family size (fertility) and the education of their
children, facing a Beckerian quantity-quality tradeoff. The alternative to education is child
labor. We assume that working children compete with unskilled adults in the labor market;2
1Similar arguments were still to be heard in the twentieth century. Opponents of a child labor bill discussed
by the state legislature of Georgia in 1900 argued that the “danger to the child was not in work, but in idleness
which led to vice and crime.” (Davidson 1939, p. 77). The bill was defeated.
2The fact that child labor and adult labor are substitutable has been documented by Levison, Anker, Ashraf,
and Barge (1998) in a case study of India’s carpet making industry, among others. This particular industry is
an important example, because carpet making is one of the areas where it is often claimed that children perform
1more precisely, the participation of children in the labor market increases the wage of skilled
workers and reduces the wage of unskilled workers.
CLR, in the form of a ban on child labor, are introduced when a majority of the adult pop-
ulation supports them. When deciding whether to support or oppose CLR, adults weigh two
effects. First, child labor provides income for parents whose children are working. Second,
CLR affect current and future wages. Skilled workers are opposed to CLR, since excluding
children from the labor market lowers skilled wages. Unskilled workers (the “working class”)
face a tradeoff: they weigh the loss of child labor income against the positive effect on adult
unskilled wages. This tradeoff can lead to divided opinions on child labor within the working
class. Young unskilled workers who have not yet chosen fertility have a margin of adjustment:
if child labor is banned, they can opt to have smaller families and educate their children. Most
adults, however, have already decided on their number of children in the past, and are stuck
with a given family size. This affects their views on CLR. In particular, the potential loss of
child-labor income is especially severe for workers who have many children.
Weshowthattheirreversiblenatureoffertilitydecisionscanleadtomultiplepolitico-economic
steady states. In one steady state, child labor is legal, unskilled workers have many working
children, and there is little support for the introduction of CLR. In the other steady state, child
labor is banned, families are small, and CLR enjoy wide support. In each case, the existing
politicalregimeinduces fertility decisionsthat lock parents intosupportingthestatus quo. The
existence of multiplesteady states can explain why some developingcountries persistently get
locked into equilibria where a large proportion of children work and political support for the
introductionof CLR is weak, whileother countries at similarstages of developmenthavestrict
regulations and a low incidence of child labor. 3
Historically, we observed a change in attitudes towards child labor during the industrial rev-
olution, and a growing pressure of the union movement for CLR. How can this change be
explained? According to our theory, the political support for CLR can rise over time if there is
an increase in the return to education.4 In an economy where all children of unskilled parents
specialized tasks due to a productivity advantage over adults related to their dexterity and “nimble ﬁngers.”
Contrary to these claims, the authors document that adult and child workers perform similar tasks, and are about
equally productive at them.
3Weiner (1991) provides an example of the political lock-in discussed in this paper. He argues that in India
thereis verylittle politicalpressurethereto banchildlabor,inspite of theveryhighincidenceofthe phenomenon
that is often accompanied by child illiteracy. The resistance against passing and enforcing laws forbidding child
labor is common across politicians with different ideological motivations. Even trade unions, differently from
other countries, are not active on this front, as CLR would be unpopularamongpoor workerswith large families.
4The underlying driving force can be either skill-biased technological change or the partial disappearance of
2initially work, a steady, gradual increase in the return to schooling eventually induces some
of the newly-formed families to have fewer children and send them to school. The proportion
of small families keeps increasing until, eventually, a majority of the unskilled workers sup-
port CLR. This explanation for the introduction of CLR is consistent with the observation that
CLR were ﬁrst introduced in Britain (as well as in other Western countries) in the nineteenth
century after a period of increasing wage inequality. Moreover, the introduction of CLR was
accompanied by a period of substantial fertility decline and an expansion of education, which
is again consistent with the theory.
A key prediction of the model is that the change in workers’ attitudesto CLR occurs gradually.
During the early stages of the transition, the working class does not back CLR unanimously,
since families with many children continue to depend on child labor. We would therefore ex-
pect to observe conﬂicting opinions about CLR within the working class before and right after
the introduction of CLR. Consistent with these predictions, Cunningham (1996) observes that
during the introduction of the ﬁrst restrictions in Lancashire “child labor found its strongest
and most persistent advocates within the working class, much to the embarrassment of trade
union leaders.” Similarly, when restrictions on child labor were proposed in the mill villages
in the southern U.S., many workers, particularly those with large families, were opposed pre-
cisely because their own children were working: “For an adult male operative whose entire
family worked in the mill, factory legislation would reduce family income. Such operatives
tended to oppose child labor laws” (Nardinelli 1990 p. 142).
Our emphasis on the attitudes of unskilled workers is motivated by the observation that in
Britain as well as the United States, the trade union movement played a key role in lobbying
for the introduction of CLR.5 According to Nardinelli (1990), the unions’ actions were driven
mainly by a concern about children competing with unskilled adults in the labor market, and
therefore exerting downward pressure on wages. A natural question to ask is whether the
labor movement had the political strength to impose its desired child labor policy. A thorough
specialized tasks for children. The latter has been argued to be an important feature in the second half of the
nineteenth century (see Kirby 1999).
5InBritain, someregulationofchildlaborwasintroducedasearlyas1802withthe“FactoryHealthandMoral
Acts” targetedatapprenticesin the cottonand woolenindustries. Theﬁrsteffectiveregulationof theemployment
of childrenwas introducedwith the FactoryActsof 1833,but thescope ofthe restrictionwas limitedto the textile
industry. A series of Factory Acts extended the restrictions ﬁrst to the mines, in 1842, and then to other non-
textile industries in the 1860s and 1870s. While humanitarian organizations were a major driving force behind
the ﬁrst regulations, the labor unions were the main supporters of additional legislation in the second half of the
nineteenth century. CLR came later in the U.S., with state regulation being introduced mainly between 1880 and
1910, and federal statutes starting to appear in 1910-1920.
3investigation of the role of political institutions is beyond the scope of our analysis. We note,
however, that in spite of the limited voting rights of the poor in the nineteenth century, unions
were able to achieve improvements in labor legislation in favor of their members (such as
shorter working hours, safety regulations etc., see Marimon and Zilibotti 2000) through other
actionssuchas strikesorpubliccampaigns. Acomplementaryargumentisthatthesameforces
that led unionsto campaignfor CLR also led other, politicallypowerfulgroups toweaken their
resistance against restrictions. We examine this possibility in an extension that analyzes the
effect of skill-biased technological change on capitalists’ views on CLR.
In the next section, we relate our work to the existing literature. Section 2 describes the model
economy. In Section 3 we analyze steady states for ﬁxed policies and provide conditions for
existence and uniqueness. Political economy is introduced in Section 4, where we provide
conditions for the existence of multiple steady state political equilibria (SSPE). Some empir-
ical evidence is also discussed. Section 5 demonstrates how exogenous changes in the skill
premium can trigger the introduction of CLR, and Section 6 considers how capital owners are
affected by this transition. Section 7 concludes.
1 Related Literature
A number of authors have recently developed arguments about why ruling out child labor
might be socially desirable. In Basu and Van (1998), CLR can be beneﬁcial because par-
ents dislike child labor, but have to send their children to work if their income falls below
a subsistence level. Ruling out child labor can increase the wage sufﬁciently to push family
incomes above the subsistence level even when children do not work. The model is extended
by Bardhan and Udry (1999) (Ch. 4) to incorporate a fertility decision. They show that multi-
ple equilibria with different fertility rates can emerge if preferences are such that poor parents
send their children to work, while richer parents do not. Both models feature static multiple
equilibria in the labor market, and CLR can be used to select the “good” equilibrium, ruling
out the possibility of a coordination failure. In contrast, our model has a unique equilibrium
in the absence of regulation, and the multiplicity of steady states relies on a politico-economic
mechanism that is not present in these two papers.
Other reasons why child labor may be inefﬁcient are presented by Baland and Robinson
(2000), Dessy and Pallage (2001), and Ranjan (2001), who exploretheroleof imperfectionsin
ﬁnancial markets and additional forms of coordination failure. Krueger and Tjornhom (2004)
4study, as we do, the distributional conﬂicts associated with the introduction of CLR. However,
they focus on human capital externalities and abstract from fertility choice and endogenous
policies. Basu (1999) and Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2003) provide recent overviews of the
economic literature on child labor.
An important empirical question is whether CLR actually mattered, in the senseof being bind-
ing or legally enforced. A number of studies have measured the effects of legal restrictions on
labor supply and the education of children. Peacock (1984) documents that the British Factory
Acts of 1833, 1844 and 1847 were actively enforced by inspectors and judges, resulting in a
large number of ﬁrms being prosecuted and convicted from 1834 onwards. Galbi (1997) ﬁnds
that the number of children employed in English cotton mills fell signiﬁcantly after the intro-
duction of the restrictions in the 1830s. Moving to the U.S., Acemoglu and Angrist (2000)
use state-by-state variation in child labor laws to estimate the size of human capital external-
ities. Using data from 1920 to 1960, their results suggest that CLR were binding in most of
this period. Similar ﬁndings are reported by Lleras-Muney (2002) and Angrist and Krueger
(1991), who show that compulsory schooling laws had a signiﬁcant effect on schooling in
the twentieth century. Margo and Finegan (1996) focus on earlier data from the 1900 census,
and ﬁnd that the combination of compulsory schooling laws with child labor regulation was
binding in the sense that it signiﬁcantly raised school attendance, while compulsory schooling
laws alone had insigniﬁcant effects.6
To the extent that the introduction of CLR in our model coincides with a demographic tran-
sition, our analysis is related to a recent macroeconomic literature that examines the causes
of fertility decline in the course of development. These include Berdugo and Hazan (2002),
Doepke (2004), Galor and Moav (2002), and Galor and Weil (2000). Berdugo and Hazan dis-
cusstheeffect ofan exogenouschangeinCLR, and showthatit mayexpeditethedemographic
transition and temporarily foster growth. The ultimate driving force behind the demographic
transition in these models is similar to the skill-biased technological change that triggers the
introduction of CLR in our model, although we do not endogenize the source of technological
progress. Our theory extends existing theories of demographic change by showing that fertil-
ity decline can trigger changes in social policies, which in turn accelerate the progress of the
demographic transition.
Our theory is also related to Galor and Moav (2003), who use a model with ﬁnancial mar-
6However, Moehling (1999) ﬁnds a limited effect of state-by-state differences in minimum age limits from
1880 to 1910. In Section 5 we argue that, according to our theory, these results are consistent with binding CLR.
5ket imperfections to show that an increase in the return to human capital may have induced
capitalists to support education subsidies for the poor. Since CLR are an instrument to ex-
pand education, their theory implies that capitalists might also support CLR. We show in an
extension that our theory bears a similar prediction: CLR may beneﬁt capitalists by inducing
parents to educate their children and increasing the average skill of the work force. UnlikeGa-
lor and Moav, however, we choose to place most of the emphasis on the political preference
of the working class, since historically unions rather than factory owners were the main active
campaigners for CLR. Nevertheless, the success of the unions’ action may have been possible
only because of diminished opposition from industrialists. We therefore view explanations
based on the attitudes of the working class versus the capitalists as complementary.
2 The Model
The model economy is populated by overlapping generations of agents differing in age and
skill. There are two skill levels, high and low (h ∈{ S,U}), and two age groups, young and
old. Agentsageand diestochastically. Each householdconsistsofoneparent and herchildren,
where the number of children depends on the parent’s earlier fertility decisions. Adults die in
each period with probability λ. Whenever a parent dies, her children become adult. As soon
as they become adult, agents decide on their number of children. For simplicity,there are only
two family sizes, large (grande) and small (petite) (n ∈{ G,P},w h e r eG and P are integers).
All adults work and supply one unit of (skilled or unskilled) labor. Children may either work
or go to school. Working children provide l<1 units of unskilled labor in each period in
which they work. Children in school supply no labor, and there is a schooling cost, p,p e r
child. When they become adult, children who worked in the preceding period become skilled
with probability π0, whereas children who went to school become skilled with probability
π1 >π 0. For simplicity, we assume that only schooling received in the period before aging
determines the probability for an agent of becoming skilled. The education choice is denoted
by e ∈{ 0,1},w h e r ee =1corresponds to school and e =0to child labor.
In the model economy, all decisions are carried out by adults. Young adults choose once and
for all how many children they want, and they also decide on the education of their children in
the current period. Old adults are locked into the family size that they chose when becoming
adult and, consequently, only choose the current education of their children e ∈{ 0,1}.F o r
an adult who has already chosen her number of children, the individual state consists of her
6skill level and her number of children. Adults are altruistic towards their children, in the sense
that the children’s future (adult) utility enters the parent’s utility function. More precisely,
Vnh denotes the utility of an old agent with n children and skill h. Preferences are deﬁned
over consumption c, discounted future utility in case of survival, and the average discounted
expected utility of the children in the case of death. The utility of an agent with n children and
skill h is then given by













+( 1− λ)βVnh (Ω
 ), (1)
where the maximization is subject to the budget constraint
c + pne ≤ wh (Ω) + (1 − e)nlwU (Ω).
Here, u(·)is an increasingand concavefunction,Ω is theaggregatestateof theeconomy(to be
deﬁned in detail below), Ω  the state in the following period, wh the wage for skill level h,a n d
e denotestheeducation decision. Consumptionis restricted to benonnegative. Theprobability
of survival is 1 − λ, and future utility is discounted by the factor β. With probability λ,a n
adult passes away and applies discount factor βz to the children’s utility. The parameter z
is allowed to differ from one, so that parents can value their children’s utility more or less
than they would value their own future utility. For utility to be well-deﬁned, we assume that
βz < 1. With probability πe, which depends on the educational choice e, the offspring will
be skilled. After their skill has been realized in the next period, aging children will have the
possibility of choosing their optimal family size, hence the term maxn∈{G,P}Vnh (Ω ).
The budget constraint has consumption and, if e =1 , the schooling cost on the expenditure
side. The revenue side is made up of the wage income of the adult plus, if e =0 , the wage in-
come of the n working children. Note that children do not consume, although this assumption
could easily relaxed. Once family size has been chosen by a young adult, the only remaining
decision is whether to educate the children or send them to work. In making this decision,
parents weigh the higher income and consumption that they can derive in the present when
their children work against the additional expected utility that their children will enjoy in the
future if they receive education.
The young adults’ decision problem on fertility n ∈{ G,P} is simpliﬁed by the fact that the
number of children n does not enter utility directly, since they only care about their children’s
7average utility. Parents will therefore have a large number of children only if they expect to
send them to work, because in that case having more children results in a higher income. The
model thus incorporates a particularly stark form of the quantity-quality tradeoff on which
much of the economic literature on fertility choice is based. Despite the simple formulation
adopted here, the model delivers one of the key implications of quantity-quality fertility mod-
els, namely the fact that parents economize on family size when they invest heavily in the
education of their children. This implication would still hold if parents also had some direct
concern about family size, as long as for families who choose education for their children the
motive to economize on the education cost is sufﬁciently strong.
We now moveto the production side of the economy. The consumption good is produced with
a technology that uses skilled and unskilled labor as inputs. The technology features constant
returns to scale and a decreasing marginal product to each factor. Formally, we can write
output per unskilled worker, y,a s
y = f (x),
where x ≡ XS/XU is the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor supply, and f is an increasing and
concave function. Labor markets are competitive, and wages are equal to the marginal product
of each factor:
wS = f
  (x),w U = f (x) − f
  (x)x. (2)
The main role of the production setup is to generate an endogenous skill premium. Notice that
skilled and unskilled labor enter the production technology in an essentially symmetric way.
Apart from the fact that education makes a worker more likely to be skilled, the key feature
that distinguishes the two types of labor is that children provide unskilled labor, and therefore
are substitutes for unskilled adult workers. If child labor is restricted, the supply of unskilled
labor falls, and therefore the unskilled wage rises. This wage effect is one of the key motives
that determines agents’ political preferences regarding CLR (the other motive being potential
child labor income, which, in turn, depends on the number of children).7
We still need to determine the supply of workers at each skill level. It simpliﬁes the exposition
to restrict attention to economies where all children who do not work go to school. This is
necessarily a feature of the equilibrium if the cost of education is sufﬁciently small. We will
denote by xnh the total number of adults of each type after family size has been determined by
7The unskilled workers would never support child labor laws if child labor and unskilled labor were com-
plements instead of substitutes. Interestingly, almost all early child labor laws in Europe and the U.S. explicitly
excluded agriculture, where it is often argued that adult and child labor are indeed complementary.
8the young adults, and deﬁne
Ω={xPU,x GU,x PS,x GS}
as the state vector.8 The child labor supply is equal to
L = l((1 − eGU)xGU +( 1− eGS)xGS)G + l((1 − ePU)xPU +( 1− ePS)xPS)P, (3)
where enh denotes the educational choice of parents of type n,h.H e r eenh is a group average,
and can be between zero and one if positive fractions of parents of type n,h decide to send
their children to school and work, respectively. The supply of skilled and unskilled labor is
now given by
XS = xPS+ xGS,
XU = xPU + xGU + L.
The state vector Ω follows a Markov process such that
Ω
  = ((1 − λ) · I + λ · Γ(ηU,η S)) · Ω, (4)
where I is the identity matrix, ηU,η S denote the proportion of young unskilled and skilled
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is a transition matrix, conditional on the choice of family size of the young adults.9
8Note that young adults choose their family size at the beginningof the period, before anything else happens.
After their choice, they become old adults. The state vector summarizesthe numberof workers of each type after
this decision has been taken. Thus, formally, this decision is subsumed into the law of motion.
9Consider, for instance, the measure of adult unskilled workers with small families, xPU,t+1. (1 − λ)xPU,t
is the measure of surviving old unskilled adults with small families. The rest consists of young adults:
ληU (1 − π1)Px PU,t children of unskilled parents with small families who had given their offspring an edu-
9We restrict attention to economies where the skilled wage is higher than theunskilled wage. In
fact, weimposethestrongerrequirementthatskilledadultsalwaysreceivehigherconsumption
than unskilled adults, even if the former choose a small family and educate their children,
whereas the latter choose a large family of working children. To this aim, recall that wages
are given by marginal products and depend on the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor supply.
The highest possible ratio of skilled to unskilled labor supply is given by x ≡ π1/(1 − π1),




 (x) − pP > [f(x) − f
 (x)x](1 + Gl)
We are now ready to deﬁne an equilibrium for our economy. In the deﬁnition, we assume
that the child labor policy is exogenous, i.e., the amount of unskilled labor l that children
can supply is ﬁxed. It is easy to extend the deﬁnition to the case of an exogenous but time-
varying policy, by adding a time subscript to l and switching to a sequential deﬁnition of an
equilibrium. Later on, we will also consider equilibria with an endogenous policy choice.
Deﬁnition 1 (Recursive Competitive Equilibrium) An equilibrium consists of functions (of
the state vector Ω) Vnh , enh, wh, and ηh,w h e r en ∈{ G,P} and h ∈{ U,S} , and a law of
motion m for the state vector, such that:
• Utilities Vnh satisfy the Bellman equation (1), and education decisions enh attain the
maximum in (1).
• Decisions of young adults are optimal, i.e., for h ∈{ U,S}:
If ηh(Ω) = 0 : VGh(Ω) ≥ VPh(Ω),
if ηh(Ω) = 1 : VGh(Ω) ≤ VPh(Ω),
if ηh(Ω) ∈ (0,1) : VGh(Ω) = VPh(Ω),
cation, ληU (1 − π0)GxGU,t children of unskilled parents with large families who had given their offspring no
education, ληU (1 − π1)Px PS,tchildren of skilled parents with small families who had given their offspring an
education, and, ﬁnally, ληU (1 − π0)GxGS,t children of skilled parents with large families who had given their
offspring no education. A similar reasoning applies to the remaining variables.
10• Wages wh are given by (2).
• For Ω  = m(Ω), the law of motion m satisﬁes (4).
We conclude the description of our theoretical framework with a discussion of the model as-
sumptions. Themodelingstrategyis aimed at preserving analyticaltractability,whileallowing
aquantitativeexplorationoftheeconomicissuesanalyzed. Themodelfocuseson threedimen-
sions of heterogeneity in the population: age, family size, and skills. Heterogeneity in family
size and skills is essential to ourtheory, sinceit is along thesedimensionsthat attitudes to CLR
differ across agents. Age heterogeneity is introduced to distinguish between three states of an
individual: childhood, young adulthood (before fertility is chosen), and old adulthood (after
fertility is chosen). The distinctionbetween young and old adulthood is an essential ingredient
as well, since it is the irreversible nature of fertility decisions (i.e., decisions that old adults
made in the past) that locks agents into particular attitudes to CLR, and ultimately gives rise to
multiple politico-economic steady states. Our speciﬁc formulation with stochastic aging was
chosen because it generates the three stages of life in a parsimonious way, while abstracting
from additional life-cycle aspects that are unrelated to the issue at hand. As an alternative, the
analysis could have been cast in a multi-period OLG model with deterministic aging. Such a
model, however, would be much more complicated, since we would have to explicitly distin-
guish multiple periods of adulthood. In our stochastic formulation, in contrast, once fertility
is chosen age does not matter, and families are only distinguished by their skill type and their
number of children.10 Despite the fact that stochastic aging is not realistic in a literal sense,
the model captures the essential distinction between young and old adults.
A number of assumptions concerning the reproduction and upbringing process are motivated
by tractability and by the desire to facilitate the computation of political equilibria. First, we
assumethatthefertilitychoice ismadein theﬁrst period ofadulthood. Thisassumptionavoids
complicated interactions between the age of an individual and the number of children she can
have, which would dramatically increase the dimension of the state space. Second, we assume
thatachildagesonlywhenherparent dies. Withoutthisassumption,additionaltypesofagents
would have to be introduced (namely, parents without dependent children and orphans). The
assumption can be justiﬁed economically if we interpret age not literally, but as a particular
10We also could have cast the analysis into the framework of a stylized two-period OLG model, where agents
have children in the beginningof the second period. However, in such a model, the entire adult populationwould
be replaced in every period, preventing smooth demographic transitions accompanied by a gradual change of
attitudes towards CLR. Moreover, static multiple self-fulﬁlling equilibria would be an endemic feature of such a
speciﬁcation.
11role in life that children have to ﬁll once their parents pass away. Third, while the structure
of the model entails a Beckerian quantity-quality trade-off, our setup differs from the standard
altruistic family model of Becker and Barro (1988) in that, in our model, altruism does not
depend on the number of children, and only two choices each for education and fertility are
possible. Despite the simpliﬁcations, the key implications of our model are similar to richer
models with a continuous fertility choice.11 We restrict ourselves to a particularly simple
structure in order to keep the model sufﬁciently tractable to allow the computation of dynamic
political equilibria.
The heterogeneity in skill is introduced in the form of a stochastic return to education (i.e., for
some agents education turns out not to be effective). This is in our view a realistic description
of the mapping between education and skill acquisition, which encompasses the more tradi-
tional model where education always leads to skill acquisition. Our more general speciﬁcation
is consistent with steady-state equilibria where all agents educate their children, and allows us
to characterize economies where, as in the real world, child labor disappears altogether. The
assumption that skill is solely determined by education received in the ﬁnal period of child-
hood (right before turning adult) also simpliﬁes the analysis, because otherwise additional
state variables would have to be introduced. The economic interpretation of this assumption
is that skill is subject to depreciation, and therefore renewed education is necessary if skill is
not immediately put to use. The basic mechanism in our model does not depend on this as-
sumption, and we conjecture that a model where education takes place over multiple periods
would lead to similar results.
3 Steady States with Fixed Policies
We begin the analysis of the model by examining steady states with exogenous policies. For-
mally, we assume child labor to be unrestricted. However, the analysis also comprises steady
states with CLR, since ruling out child labor amounts to setting the parameter l that denotes
11Doepke (2004) considers the choice of education versus child labor in an otherwise standard Barro-Becker
model with skilled and unskilled workers. As in our model, unskilled workers are more likely to choose child
labor, and fertility is higher conditional on choosing child labor. The main difference is that in Doepke (2004)
the fertility differential is endogenous, while it is exogenously ﬁxed in our setup.
One can interpret the large family size in our model as corresponding to a physiological upper bound on the
number of children an individual can have. In our model, agents who do not educate their children would like
to have as many children as possible, so this would be a corner solution of the fertility choice. The number of
children in the small family can instead be related to the cost of rearing and educating children.
12the amount of labor supplied by children to zero.
A steady state is an equilibrium where the fraction of each type of adult in the population is
constant, and a constant fraction ηU of unskilled parents decide to have small families. Deﬁne
Nt = xPU,t+ xGU,t + xPS,t+ xGS,t to be total number of adults. The steady-state fractions
of a given type of adult is given by ξj ≡ xj/N, the vector of these fractions is denoted by
Ξ={ξPU, ξGU, ξPS, ξGS} and the population growth rate is denoted by gt = Nt+1/Nt − 1.
Using this notation, in steady state the law of motion (4) specializes to
(1 + g) · Ξ = ((1 − λ) · I + λ · Γ(ηU,η S)) · Ξ, (5)
1 · Ξ=1 . (6)
Note that, given preferences as deﬁned in (1), in steady state all agents with small families
educate their children, and all agents with large families choose child labor. Equations (5) and
(6) deﬁne a system of ﬁve linear equations in ﬁve unknowns, ξPU,ξ GU,ξ PS,ξ GS and g.T h e
fractions ηU and ηS have to satisfy the usual equilibrium conditions. In Appendix A.2, we
formally establish the following intuitive properties of steady states:
1. Ifat least someskilledparents choosetohavelargefamilies, all unskilledparents strictly
prefer the large family size; conversely, if at least some unskilled parents choose small
families, all skilled parents have small families (Lemma 1).
2. In the solution of the system (5)–(6), the average population growth rate falls in the
fraction of agents deciding to have small families (Lemma 2).
3. In the solution of the system (5)–(6), the fraction of skilled adults in the population
strictly increases in both ηU and ηS, i.e., more education implies a larger skilled-to-
unskilled ratio (Lemma 3).
The intuitionfor Lemma 1 is that since skilled adults have a higher income, their utility cost of
providing education to their children is smaller. Therefore, skilled parents are generally more
inclined towards educating their children than unskilled parents, and educating the children
implieschoosing thesmall familysize. Thelemmaallows potentialsteady states to be indexed
by the sum ˜ η ≡ ηS + ηU, where ˜ η ∈ [0,2] (recall that ηi is the fraction of adults of skill type
i who choose to have small families). Furthermore, Lemma 3 implies the steady state skill
premium is decreasing in ˜ η. 12 Five candidate types of steady states can be distinguished:
12Note that whenever ˜ η takes on an integer value, i.e., ˜ η ∈{ 0,1,2} all agents in (at least) one group strictly
131. All agents educate their children, ˜ η =2 .
2. All skilled workers and a positive proportion of the unskilled workers educate their
children, ˜ η ∈ (1,2).
3. All skilled workers and no unskilled workers educate their children, ˜ η =1 .
4. A positive proportion of the skilled workers and no unskilled workers educate their
children, ˜ η ∈ (0,1).
5. No agents educate their children, ˜ η =0 .
In steady states with either ˜ η =2or ˜ η =0 , all agents behave identically. When ˜ η =2 ,
the wage premium is at its lower bound, all children receive an education, and all families
are small. Conversely, when ˜ η =0 , the wage premium is at its upper bound, all children
work, and all families are large. In the steady state with ˜ η =1 , at the equilibrium wage, all
unskilled parents have large families and make their children work, while skilled workers ﬁnd
it optimal to educate their children. Finally, when ˜ η ∈ (1,2) or ˜ η ∈ (0,1) either the skilled or
the unskilled parents are just indifferent between having large uneducated or small educated
families. The formal conditions for each of the steady states to obtain as an equilibrium are
provided in the appendix.
We nowanalyzetheconditionsfor theexistenceand uniquenessofasteady state. In particular,
we want to show that under an additional condition that bounds the curvature of utility, a
unique steady state exists. This can be done by establishing that, for all adult agents, the
difference between the utilities from having a small educated versus a large uneducated family
is strictly increasing in the wage premium.
The argument can be illustrated with the aid of Figure 1. In the plot, the downward-sloping
schedule SS1 represents the negative relationship between the wage premium wS/wU and ˜ η
that follows from Lemma 3. Intuitively, an increase in the relative supply of skills, param-
eterized by ˜ η, decreases the skill premium because of decreasing marginal returns to skilled
labor in the production function. The piecewise linear schedule EE, in contrast, represents
the optimal steady state educational choice of parents as a function of the wage premium.13
prefer one of the two educational choices. If ˜ η ∈ (0,1), skilled workers are indifferent, whereas if ˜ η ∈ (1,2),
unskilled workers are indifferent.
13Educationaldecisions not only dependon the ratio, but also on the level of both the skill and unskilled wage.
In the particular case of CRRA utility and no cost of education (p =0 ), the educational choice only depends on
14In particular, for a range of low wage premia, all agents prefer not to educate their children
(˜ η =0 ), because the returns to education are too low. For an intermediate range of wage
premia, education is chosen only by skilled agents (˜ η =1 ). For a range of high wage premia,
all agents prefer education (˜ η =2 ). Between these regions, there exist threshold wage premia
wS/wU and ¯ wS/ ¯ wU at which, respectively, either skilled workers (˜ η ∈ (0,1)) or unskilled
workers (˜ η ∈ (1,2)) are indifferent.
A steady state is characterized by an intersection of the SS1 and EE schedules, because here
the fertility and education choices of the agents are optimal given the wage premium implied
by these choices. If the difference between the utilities from educating or not educating chil-
dren is strictly increasing in the wage premium, the thresholdswS/wU and ¯ wS/ ¯ wU are unique,
the EE schedule is monotonicallyincreasing, and the SS1 and EE schedules intersect exactly
once, as in Figure 1. We then obtain a unique steady state.
In general, however, there could be multiple thresholds (i.e., the EE c u r v ec o u l db el o c a l l y
decreasing), implying the possibility of multiple steady states. While the threshold wS/wU is
always unique, there may be multiple thresholds ¯ wS/ ¯ wU. The source of this potential multi-
plicity is the ambivalent effect of an increase of the skill premium on the incentives for un-
skilled parents to provide education for their children. On the one hand, a high skill premium
renders education more attractive, since the utility derived from skilled children increases. On
the other hand, a high skill premium also implies that unskilled parents earn a lower wage,
which increases the utility cost of paying the ﬁxed cost of education. If the curvature of utility
is high, the latter effect may dominate, giving rise to the multiplicity. As an extreme example,
consider a case where the unskilled wage falls to a level where the education cost for the chil-
dren exceeds the income of the parent. Clearly, in this case the parents will not educate their
children, despite the fact that the return to education is high.
Theunderlyingcauseforthepossibilityofmultiplesteadystatesinourmodeliscloselyrelated
to the mechanisms described by Bardhan and Udry (1999), Kremer and Chen (2002), and
Moav (2005). In what follows, we want to concentrate on an alternative source of multiplicity
that arises only ifCLR are endogenous. In order not to confuse the effects of endogenous CLR
with more traditional sources of multiplicity,we now impose a parameter restriction that rules
out multiple steady states in the absence of endogenous policies. Assumption 2 ensures, under
the ratio, however. While the ﬁgure is correct for a given technology, comparative statics (e.g., a change in the
skill bias of technologythat shifts the SS schedule while not affecting the EE schedule) are legitimate only under
CRRA utility and p =0 .
15CRRA preferences, the uniqueness of the steady state by imposing bounds on the curvature of
utility in the relevant range:
Assumption 2
(1 + Gl)
1 − β (1 − λ)
1 − β (1 − λ(1 − z (π1 − π0)))
>
u (wU,2 − pP)
u (wU,2(1 + Gl)))
.
Given this assumption, the uniqueness of steady states in the absence of endogenous CLR can
be established (the proof of the proposition is provided in Appendix A.3.).
Proposition 1 Under Assumption (2) and CRRA preferences, there exists a unique steady
state.
Later on, we will analyze the effects of a shift in the skill bias of the technology on outcomes
in a political economy framework. With the uniqueness of steady states established, we can
use Figure 1 to assess the implications of such a change for the steady state given a ﬁxed,
exogenous child labor policy. Consider, for example, a Cobb-Douglas technology, where the
skill bias can be parameterized by the share of output that is used to compensate skilled labor.
Suppose that, initially, the share of skilled labor is low. The corresponding supply schedule is
described by the SS0 line, so that ˜ η =0obtains in the steady state. An increase in the share of
skilled labor shifts the SS schedule to the right (i.e., the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages for
any given relative supply of skills increases), while the EE curves remain unaffected. Thus,
in the new steady state ˜ η will be higher. If the supply schedule shifts to SS1, in the new
steady state all skilled and some unskilled workers educate their children, i.e., ˜ η ∈ (1,2).F o r
a sufﬁciently large shift in the skill bias, all workers eventually educate their children (see
schedule SS2).
An increase in skill bias therefore induces more families to educate their children, even if
child labor continues to be legal. We will see below that if CLR are endogenous, an increase
in skill bias can also trigger the introduction of stringent CLR, even at a level of the skill bias
where, absent regulation, many families would still ﬁnd it optimal to send their children to
work. Before turning to transition of this type, however, we ﬁrst need to discuss steady states
with endogenous CLR.
164 Steady States with Endogenous Policies
So far, we have established that the model has a unique steady state when parents can choose
freely whether to make their children work. Imposing a child labor ban corresponds to setting
l to zero. More generally, we can think of CLR as equivalent to reducing the parameter
l: for instance, CLR may impose restrictions on the maximum working hours or forbid the
use of child labor in “dangerous activities” (e.g., mines) where children have a comparative
advantage,forcingparentstoshiftchildlabortootherworkingactivities. Therefore, theresults
of the previous section can be interpreted as showing that there is a unique steady state for any
child labor policy that is exogenously ﬁxed.14
We now want to establish that multiple steady states can exist if CLR are determined endoge-
nously. It is easy to construct examples where, for instance, all parents choose large families
with working children (˜ η =0 ) if there are no CLR, but the introduction of CLR moves the
economy to a steady state equilibrium where all parents choose small families with educated
children (˜ η =2 ). Assume that the cost of schooling is inﬁnitesimal (p → 0)a n dt h a tC L R
takes the form of a complete ban, i.e., l =0 . Then, it is immediatethat, under CLR, all parents
would choose small families and send their children to school (in Figure 1, the EE line would
be horizontal at ˜ η =2 ). In the absence of CLR, an equilibrium with ˜ η =0holds if parents
value the current consumption that can be derived from making their children work more than
the additional expected utility their children would obtain through education.15 This condition
is satisﬁed if the weight z that parents attach to the utility of their children is sufﬁciently low.
Thus, we can construct cases in which all families are small and children go to school if CLR
are in place, whereas the steady state features widespread child labor if CLR are lacking.
While CLR was treated as exogenous in this example, the objective of this section is to estab-
lish the possibility of multiple steady states with different policies when the choice of policy
is endogenous. In other words, in addition to showing that different child labor policies result
in different steady-state behavior, we conversely need to establish that in each steady state the
corresponding policy has the required political support. In order to carry out this analysis, we
14Note that decreasingl movesboththe SS and the EE curvesto the leftin Figure 1. Thus, the wage premium
unambiguously falls, whereas the effect on the educational choice is, in principle, ambiguous.
15The precise condition is given by equation (14) in the appendix. If preferences are logarithmic, for instance,
this can be expressed as
ln(1 + Gl) ≥ βλz
π1 − π0







where the wage premium depends on G, π0 and π1, but not on the discount factor βλz.
17must specify a political mechanism in the model. We assume that CLR can be irreversibly
introduced when a majority of adult agents support them. This “referendum” decision is a
stand-in for more complicated decision processes wherein different groups in society can exert
political pressure to introduce restricting laws. A possible interpretation of our reduced-form
political mechanism is that unions can imposetheir will on the issueof CLR. Unions represent
the interests of all workers, and decide according to the will of the majority of their members,
where the majority is unskilled.16 In reality, of course, the situation is more complex, and
the effectiveness of unions’ actions are mediated by a variety of political institutions. We still
regard it as useful to focus on the interests of unskilled workers, as in our model this is the
only group that could potentially gain from (and which indeed historically supported) CLR.
In short, our analysis pins down under which conditions the “working class” supports the in-
troduction of CLR. We will also ask the opposite question. Namely, would a majority in an
economy where CLR have been in effect for a long time prefer that CLR be abandoned?
The main result is that, under certain parameter restrictions, the economy is such that in a
steady state with no CLR, a majority of the adults (the skilled and some or all of the unskilled)
will be opposed to the introduction of CLR. Conversely, if CLR exist, a majority of the adults
(some or all of the unskilled) will prefer to keep the restrictions in place. Thus, each pol-
icy leads to a steady state that implies political support for the same policy. The source of
this multiplicity is that old adults are locked into the family size that they chose previously,
which in turn determines their policy preferences. As in the example above, absent CLR un-
skilled workers choose large families and make their children work, whereas, if CLR were in
place, they choose small families and educate their children. This feedback between political
decisions and family size gives rise to multiple steady states. For simplicity, we will state
the analytical results under the assumption that the child labor policy includes compulsory
schooling.17
Deﬁnition 2 (Steady State Political Equilibrium) A steady state political equilibrium
(SSPE) consists of a child labor policy (child labor is either ruled out or not), ˜ η ∈ [0,2]
denoting the distribution of educational choices, utilities VPS, VGS,V PU, VGU of each type
of family, a child labor supply L, constant fractions ξPS, ξGS,ξ PU, and ξGU of each type of
family, and a population growth rate g that:
16We couldalternativelyassume that skilled and unskilledworkers are unequallyrepresentedwithin the union.
This would not change the qualitative results.
17If the CLR does not include a compulsory schooling provision, the result establishing multiplicity of steady
states still goes through, but requires additional, if natural, assumptions on the production function.
18• Given the policy, the steady state satisﬁes all equilibrium conditions in Deﬁnition 1.
• A majority of adults obtain higher utility under the current child labor policy than if the
opposite policy were permanently in place.
From the perspective of old unskilled agents, CLR imply both gains (higher wages) and losses
(no child labor income). The tradeoff determines whether they support CLR. The key factor
leading to multiple SSPE is the lock-in in terms of family size decisions. The loss of child
labor income is larger for families with many children. CLR induce smaller families who
support CLR, while the absence of CLR induces larger families, who oppose CLR. Assume
that unskilled agents are pivotal (if skilled agents were pivotal, there would be no equilibrium
with CLR). Consider, ﬁrst, an SSPE where child labor is unrestricted. In this steady state,
unskilled families are large, and their children work. If CLR were introduced, there would
be an immediate increase in the unskilled wage since children are withdrawn from the labor
force. FortheSSPE to besustained, thegainfrom thisgeneral equilibriumeffect mustbemore
than offset by the loss of child labor income. The fact that families are large and earn a large
fraction of their income from child labor makes it more likely that unskilled workers prefer
the status quo. Conversely, in a candidate SSPE where child labor is unrestricted, families
are initially smaller. If CLR were lifted, unskilled families would have little to gain from
making their children work. Once again, agents would prefer the status quo (CLR in this
case). Building on this intuition, Proposition 2, proven in Appendix A.3, formally establishes
the existence of multiple SSPE.
Proposition 2 The model parameters can be chosen such that:
• The old unskilled are the majority.
• In the absence of CLR, the steady state features ˜ η<2.
• Both CLR and no CLR are SSPE.
We now illustrate the theoretical results obtained so far by analyzing steady states in a pa-
rameterized version of our economy. Table 1 displays the parameter values used. Preferences









19The fertility values for small and large families are P =1and G =3 . A family of two
would therefore have two children if they prefer education, or six children if they opt for child
labor. This fertility differential approximates the fertility differential between mothers in the
lowest and highest income quintiles in countries with widespread child labor, such as Brazil or
Mexico (see Kremer and Chen 2002). The choice for λ implies that adults on average live for
62
3 periods. Assuming that a model period corresponds to six years, people survive 40 years
on average after becoming adults. The probabilities π0 =0 .05 and π1 =0 .4 of becoming
skilled are chosen so that the fractions of skilled agents in a pre-industrial (i.e., where no
children receive formal education) and post-industrial (i.e., where all children receive formal
education) societies are, respectively, 5 percent and 40 percent. The choices of λ, π0,a n d
π1 jointly imply that the old unskilled always constitute the majority of the population. β is
chosen so that it impliesa rate of timepreference that would generate an annual interest rate of
4 percent peryear(ifassets couldbetraded), whichis thestandard basisforcalibratingβ inthe
RBC literature. Thechoice l =0 .1 forthesupplyofchildlaborimpliesthatalargefamilywith
working children derives about a quarter of family income from children, which is in line with
evidence from Britain in the period of early industrialization (Horrell and Humphries 1995)
and recent data from developing countries. The elasticity parameter κ =0 .5 sets the elasticity
of substitutionhalf way between the Cobb-Douglas and the linear production technology. The
weight α of skilled labor in the production function is left unspeciﬁed for now. We will use α
to parameterize the skill premium and compute outcomes for a variety of α.
We start by determining which steady states and SSPE exist for different values of α. Recall
from Section 3 that as long as Assumption 2 is satisﬁed, there is a unique steady state in the
economy without CLR. Figure 2 displays the steady state ˜ η as a function of α.F o rl o wα,t h e
skill premium is low. Consequently, education is not very attractive, and there is a range of α
where all parents prefer child labor (˜ η =0 ). As the skill premium rises, we reach a threshold
for α at which a fraction of skilled adults educates their children (˜ η ∈ (0,1)), and ultimately
all skilled parents chooseeducation (˜ η =1 ). Foreven higher α, there is a wideregion in which
unskilled parents are indifferent between education and child labor (˜ η ∈ (1,2)). Throughout
this region, higher α are offset by a higher supply of skilled labor, which keeps the unskilled
parents indifferent. Ultimately, all parents educate their children (˜ η =2).
Figure 3 considers the model with endogenous policy choice, and shows which SSPE exist as
a function of α. For low values of α, the only SSPE is no CLR. In other words, the return to
education is so low that even a population of adults all of whom have small families would
prefer to abandon CLR. For an intermediate range of α, there are multiple SSPE: both CLR
20and no CLR are steady states supported by a majority of the population. In the range of
multiplicity, in the absence of CLR at least a fraction of unskilled agents would choose child
labor and large families. However, if CLR are already in place, unskilled parents are locked
into having small families, and therefore prefer to keep CLR. As the wage premium increases,
weenteraregionwhereCLRis theonlySSPE. Inthisregion, evenunskilledparentswithlarge
families prefer to introduce CLR. The immediate income loss after the introduction of CLR is
made up for by higher unskilled wages in the present (because other parents’ children can no
longer work) and in the future (which they care about because they care for their children).
To establish that the multiplicity result depends on endogenous fertility choice, we also com-
puted outcomes without fertility differentials by setting P = G =1 , i.e., families of working
and educated children are of the same size. We still ﬁnd that, for low α’s, no CLR is an SSPE,
and for high α’s CLR is an SSPE. However, there is no overlap, i.e., in no region can both
policies be supported in steady state, since the policies no longer lock agents into different
fertility choices. In fact, there is a region where neither policy is an SSPE. The reason for the
non-existence of SSPE for some α is the endogenous skill premium. If CLR are in place, the
supply of skilled labor is high, and the skill premium is low. The low skill premium makes
child labor attractive relative to education, so that a majority are in favor of abandoning CLR.
If there are no restrictions, however, the supply of skilled labor is low and the skill premium
is high. This makes education more attractive, and increases the gain from removing other
parents’ children from the labor market. As a consequence, a majority are in favor of intro-
ducing CLR. The endogenous skill premium therefore works against multiplicity of steady
states. In the model with endogenous fertility, this effect is overcome since parents choose
a different family size in each political regime, which induces them to favor the status quo.
Fertility choice provides a powerful lock-in effect, both because fertility decisions are irre-
versible, and because children are important economically: households with working children
derive a substantial share of their income from child labor, whereas households with children
in school need to spend a lot on the children’s education.
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of the empirical implications of our analysis.
According to our theory, countries can get locked into different political steady states, where
one SSPE features high fertility, high incidence of child labor, and little political support for
the introduction of CLR, whereas another SSPE features low fertility, low (or no) child labor,
and widespread support for CLR. In today’s developing countries, we observe large cross-
country differences in child labor rates, even among countries that are at similar levels of
income per capita. If our mechanism were an important factor behind cross-country variation
21in child labor rates, we would expect to ﬁnd a positive correlation between fertility and child
labor rates, even after controlling for other variables that might affect child labor or fertility.
To examine the empirical validity of this prediction, we regressed child labor rates on fertility
rates for a panel of 125 countries from 1960 to 1990, with observations at ten-year intervals,
controlling for time dummies, log(GDP), log(GDP) squared, the share of agriculture in
employment, and the share of agriculture in employment squared.18 The coefﬁcient on the
fertilityrateispositiveandhighlysigniﬁcant. Thepointestimateis1.3,andtheWhitestandard
error is 0.29 (the R2 of the regression is 0.89).19 The estimate implies that a one standard
deviationincreasein fertilityisassociated withan increasein thechildlaborrate of2.5percent
(the child labor rate varies in the sample between 0 and 59 percent with a standard deviation of
15 percent). If we add a measure of income inequality (Gini coefﬁcient), the point estimate of
the effect of inequality on child labor is positive, but statistically insigniﬁcant. If, in addition,
we include country ﬁxed-effects, the coefﬁcient on fertility becomes smaller (point estimate
of 0.41, with a standard error of 0.20), but remains statistically signiﬁcant.
The evidence of a positive correlation between fertility and child labor incidence across coun-
tries is only a preliminary step in providing empirical support for our theory. Ideally, one
would like to ﬁnd additional evidence based on cross-country comparisons of direct measures
of CLR. This is far from straightforward since regulations (and their enforcement) are difﬁcult
to measure and compare across countries. Given this difﬁculty, a more thorough empirical
investigation is left to future research.
18The child labor rate is deﬁned as the percentage of children aged 10–14 who are economically active. The
total fertility rate is deﬁned as the sum of age-speciﬁc fertility rates, i.e., the number of births divided by the
number of women of a given age. The fertility rate and the share of agriculture in employment are from the
World Bank Development Indicators, Ginis are from the Deininger-Squire data set, GDP per capita is from the
Penn World Tables, and child labor rates are from the ILO. We control for the share of agriculture because it is
well known that child labor is more widespread in the agricultural sector. We ignore endogeneity problems; the
regression is simply meant to document correlation between the variables of interest.
19Similar results hold if one runs four separate cross-countryregressions. The coefﬁcient on fertility is always
positive and highly signiﬁcant, except in 1960 when it is positive but not signiﬁcant. Including measures of
democracy does not change the results. An additional observation that is consistent with our lock-in prediction
is that cross-country differences in child labor are highly persistent over time. To demonstrate this, we sorted
countries into quintiles according to the size of the residual in the decade-by-decade child-labor regressions.
Among the 20 percent of countries with the highest child labor rate relative to the predicted value, on average 71
percent are still in the highest quintile 10 years later. Over the entire period 1960 to 1990, we ﬁnd that 85 percent
of the countries in the highest quintile in 1960 are still in the top two quintiles in 1990.
225 Transitions: The Introduction of CLR
So far, we have shown that the interaction of fertility choice and political preferences can lead
to a lock-in effect, resulting in multiple SSPE, either with child labor and high fertility or no
child labor and low fertility. This feature of the model can explain why there is a great deal of
variation in the incidence of child labor around the world, even when controlling for income
per capita. However, we also need to explain why many countries have adopted child labor
bans over the last two centuries, starting from a situation where child labor was common all
over the world. In our model, a transition from no CLR to CLR is possible if technological
change increases the skill premium, and therefore the return to education. If the increase in
the return to education is large, even some unskilled adults will prefer to have small families
and educate their children, which ultimately creates a majority in favor of the introduction of
CLR.
This explanation of the introduction of CLR is consistent with the evidence on the evolution
of the skill premium in the U.K. before the introduction of CLR. Figure 4 shows that the ratio
of skilled to unskilled wages increased sharply at the beginning of the nineteenth century.20
The skill premium reached a peak in 1850, declined subsequently, and by 1910 it had returned
to its 1820 level. To show how an increase of the skill premium can trigger the introduction of
CLR in our model, we computed a transition path for an economy that starts out in the steady
state without CLR, and then experiences a phase of skill-biased technological change (which
can be parameterized as an increase in the technology parameter α). We chose the speciﬁc
transition path such that in the steady state without CLR, the ratio of skilled to unskilled
wages in the model matches the observed value of 2.5 in the U.K. around 1820 (see Figure 4).
This is achieved by setting the initial α to 0.33 (apart from α, the model is parameterized as
in Section 4, see Table 1). The endpoint of the transition was chosen such that in the steady
state with CLR, the wage ratio matches 2.5 as well, as in the data around 1910. This implies a
ﬁnal value for α of 0.65. Notice that in the new steady state with CLR there is a higher supply
of skilled labor, so that α has to be higher than at the beginning of the transition to generate
the same skill premium. In the computed transition path, α is at 0.33 until period 2, and then
increases linearly until the maximum of 0.65 is reached in period 9. Given that one model
20The skill-premium data, from Williamson 1985, is computed as the ratio of the wages in twelve skilled and
six unskilled professions, weighted by employment shares. This data source is criticized by Feinstein (1988),
who presents alternative estimates indicating a smaller hump in skill premia. Even a ﬂatter proﬁle of the skill
premium,however,wouldindicatea signiﬁcant increasein the demandforskills, giventhe simultaneousincrease
in their supply associated with rising education in the labor force.
23period is interpreted as lasting six years, the simulations represent a phase of skill-biased
technological change that stretches out over a little more than 40 years.
Generally, the problem of computing transitions paths with an endogenous policy choice is
complicated. Agents’ decisions depend on the entire path of expected future policies. Future
policies therefore partly determine the evolution of the state vector of the economy which, in
turn, affects the political preferences over these same policies. In principle, this interdepen-
dence can lead to multipleequilibria(notjust multiplicityofsteadystates), orthenonexistence
of equilibria. It turns out, however, that unique results are obtained for the calibrated version
of our model. To limit the number of time paths of future policies, we assume that once CLR
are introduced, they cannot be revoked. 21 Future policies can therefore be indexed by the
period when CLR are introduced.
The conditions for the introduction of CLR to occur in a given period T can therefore be
checked as follows. We assume that the economy starts in the steady state corresponding to
the initial value of α. First, we compute private decisions and the evolution of the state vector
undertheassumptionthatCLRareindeedintroducedattimeT.I np e r i o dT,wecheck whether
a majority prefer the introduction of CLR to the alternative. The relevant alternative here is
not to never introduce CLR, but to expect their introduction at T +1(the skill premium and
therefore the incentive to introduce CLR increases over time, therefore if T is the equilibrium
switching time, a fortiori a majority in favor of the introduction of CLR also exists at time
T +1 .). We also must check that CLR are not introduced before T. Once more, because the
incentive to introduce CLR increases over time, it is sufﬁcient to check that given the path for
the state variable resulting from expecting the switch at T, there is still a majority opposed
to introducing CLR at time T − 1. In summary, for T to be an equilibrium switching time,
conditional on agents expecting CLR to be introduced at time T,a majority must oppose CLR
at time T − 1, and a majority must prefer CLR at time T. Since the evolution of the state
vector depends on the expected policies, there could be, in principle, multiple or none such
switching times, but in our parameterization there is a unique switching time.
In the computed transition path, a majority continues to oppose the introduction of CLR in
the ﬁrst periods of the increasing skill premium. Beginning in period 5, however, all young
unskilledadults start to choose education and small families, in response to the increasing skill
premium and the expected future introduction of CLR. Old unskilled families are stuck with
21WeconjecturethatinourspeciﬁcapplicationtheresultswouldnotchangeifweallowedCLRtoberevokable
in later periods, because we focus on an episode where the skill premium is increasing over time, which together
with the lock-in effect of endogenous fertility choice tends to increase support for CLR over time.
24many children and therefore continue to choose child labor. In periods 5 and 6, the number
of unskilled parents with small families is still too small to successfully lobby for a policy
change, but in period 7, unskilled families with a small number of children form the majority
of the population and decide to introduce CLR.
The solid line in Figure 5 displays the evolution of the skill premium during the transition
with endogenous policy choice. Initially, the skill premium increases due to an increasing α.
Once CLR are introduced and children are withdrawn from the labor market the skill premium
drops, however, since the increase in α is offset by the smaller supply of unskilled labor. After
α stops increasing, the skill premium declines further, as the number of skilled workers con-
tinues to increase. The introduction of CLR also leads to a sharp decline in population growth
(Figure 6). Notice, however, that the decline in population growth starts before CLR are intro-
duced, because young unskilled parents start to have small families already in period 5. The
switch in the decisions of young unskilled parents also triggers an immediate decline in the
supply of child labor, as shown by Figure 7. Thus, child labor declines even before CLR are
introduced.
The dashed lines in Figures 5 to 7 show the outcomes that would have occurred without the
endogenous introduction of CLR, i.e., under the assumption that child labor continues to be
legal throughout. Even without the introduction of CLR, the increase in the skill premium
ultimately induces some parents to educate their children, resulting in temporarily lower pop-
ulation growth, less child labor, and a reversal of the increase in inequality. At the same time,
the decline in child labor is only a fraction of what is achieved with the introduction of CLR,
and inequality remains much higher. Thus, in the model, neither technological change nor
CLR are solely responsible for the decline in child labor; rather, both explanations are com-
plementary. Given that the child labor rate levels out at 80 percent in the absence of CLR, in
our example the introduction of CLR is responsiblefor four-ﬁfth of the overall decline in child
labor.
The simulations reproduce key features of the data. First, both the simulation and the data ex-
hibit a hump-shape proﬁle in the skill premium (see Figure 4). Second the model predicts that
fertility rates start declining before the introduction of CLR. This timing is also featured by
the data in the history of the introduction of CLR in Britain. The ﬁrst major child labor restric-
tions (the “Factory Acts”) were put into place in 1833 and 1842, and were extended to other
non-textile industries in the 1860s and 1870s.22 The total fertility rate (see Figure 8) peaked
22The initial Factory Acts, however, only applied to some industries (textiles and mining), and Nardinelli
25around 1820, then started declining before the introduction of the Factory Acts. Then, a sec-
ond, more pronounced decline in fertility is observed after 1880, which continued throughout
the ﬁrst quarter of the twentieth century. Figure 9 shows the corresponding decline in child
labor rates (the fraction of 10 to 14 year-olds who were economically active) and increase in
schooling rates (the fraction of children aged 5–14 at school). The data are consistent with
the predictions that fertility starts falling before CLR are introduced, and that CLR cause an
acceleration in the fertility decline.23
A similar pattern can be observed in other European countries such as France, Germany and
Italy. Inthesecountries,asinBritain, CLRwereintroducedinthesecondhalfofthenineteenth
century.24 Moreover, the introduction of CLR is more closely related to changes in the fertility
behavior than to structural characteristics of these economies. In Germany and Italy, CLR
were introduced soon after the beginning of the demographic transition, and were followed by
large further reductions in fertility (in France, however, the demographic transition had started
substantially earlier). At the time of the introduction of CLR, England was an industrialized
country, with the share of agriculture near ten percent, while in Italy, for instance, well over
half of employment was still accounted for by agriculture. The differences in living standards
were also large.25
(1980) argues that while the laws effectively restricted the employment of young children in these industries, the
effect on overallchild labor was short lived. The FactoryActs were extendedto other non-textileindustriesin the
1860s and 1870s. The introduction of compulsory schooling in 1880 put an additional constraint on child labor.
Compulsionwas effectivelyenforced: in the 1880s, close to 100,000cases of truancywere prosecutedeveryyear
(see Cunningham 1996), which made truancy the second-most popular offense in terms of cases brought before
the courts (drunkenness being the ﬁrst).
23However,the transitionis sharperand morerapid in the simulationthan in the data. This discrepancymay be
due to the fact that in the simulation CLR are introduced and perfectly enforced instantaneously, whereas, in the
data, this happens progressively. Also, our model does not allow for combinations of schooling with part-time
work, while this practice was relatively widespread at the time.
24Both Germany and Italy introduced pervasive regulation after uniﬁcation. Prussia had a child labor law in
1839, which was extended to the whole German Empire after 1871. It was not until 1878, however, that the
minimum age in factories was raised to 12, and enforcement became active (see Nardinelli 1990). In Italy, the
ﬁrst child labor law was passed in Lombardyin 1843, beforeuniﬁcation. Educationbecame compulsoryin 1859,
but initially there was little enforcement of this law. A national child labor law was passed in 1873. In France,
a law passed in 1841 mandated a minimum age of eight for employment and speciﬁed a maximum workday of
eight hours for children aged eight to twelve. In addition, working children under the age of twelve were also
required to attend school. The law applied only to ﬁrms with at least 20 workers, however, and no effective
provisions for enforcement were made (Weissbach 1989). In 1874, a law was passed that applied to all ﬁrms,
set the minimum age to twelve, with minimum schooling conditions for workers under the age of 15. In 1892
the minimum age for employment was raised to 13. Inequality trends were also similar across Western countries
in the nineteenth century, see Williamson (1985) on Britain, Williamson and Lindert (1980) on the U.S., and
Brenner, Kaelble, and Thomas (1991) on Belgium, Germany, and Sweden.
25According to Maddison (1995), in 1890 GDP per capita in Italy was only 40 percent as high as in the U.K.,
26In the U.S., birth rates and total fertility rates were falling from the beginning of the nineteenth
century. However, the overall numbers mask substantial variation across states and regions.
Since until about 1910 all child labor restrictions were state laws, this variation can be related
to political developments. Most states introduced laws mandating a minimumage for employ-
ment in the period from 1880 to 1920. In 1880, only seven states had such laws; by 1910, 43
states did. The ﬁrst states to introduce child labor restrictions were also the ﬁrst to experience
substantial fertility decline. Consider the comparison of the eight states which introduced a
minimum age of employment of 14 before 1900 and the 14 states which introduced this limit
only after 1910.26 In the middle of the nineteenth century, birth rates were slightly higher in
the group of early adopters (in 1860, the birth rate was 30 in the early group and 29 in the
late group). However, after 1870 fertility decline progressed faster in the states which adopted
child labor laws early. By 1890, the average birth rate had fallen to 25 in the early group, but
was still at 30 in the late group. This birth-rate differential persisted throughout the ﬁrst part
of the twentieth century; in 1928, the difference was still 19 to 24.
Our results also suggest a reason why econometric studies which ﬁnd that child labor laws
only have a relatively small effect on the supply of child labor may be misleading. Moehling
(1999), for example, uses state-by-state variation in the introduction of CLR in the U.S. to
estimate the effects of regulations, employing a “difference-in-difference” estimator. In our
model, child labor declines even before CLR are introduced, since young families start to
have small families of educated children in response to a higher return on education. This
prediction is a robust implication of the theory, since a decline in the dependence of unskilled
families on child labor income is exactly what is required to create a constituency in favor of
CLR. The relative speed of the decline in child labor before and after the introduction of re-
strictions depends on average family size, the number of young families, and the enforcement
of CLR. To a large extent, CLR work indirectly by reducing family size and changing fami-
lies’ education decisions, as opposed to directly removing children from the labor market who
would otherwise have worked. It is possible that from an econometrician’s perspective, the
measured impact of the legislation appears to be small (i.e., there is a small or no difference
in the decline of child labor before and after the introduction of CLR, either within or across
and lower than GDP per capita in the U.K. in 1820. Relative to the U.K., in 1890 France and Germany were at
57 and 62 percent, respectively.
26The states in the ﬁrst group are Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New York,
and Wisconsin. The groupof late adoptersis made up of Alabama,Delaware, Florida,Georgia,Mississippi, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia.
Birth rate ﬁgures are from the U.S. Census.
27states). The true effect of CLR would be larger than this empirical measure, since it is not
generally true that the child labor rate would have continued to decrease without a law. In our
example, if no CLR are introduced, child labor rates remain at 60 to 80 percent throughout.
The restrictions therefore account for the major part of the ultimate decline in child labor. A
difference-in-difference estimator would have compared the decline in child labor before and
after the introduction of the law, which would suggest, misleadingly, a much smaller effect of
the legislation.
6 Would Capitalists Support CLR?
A possible objection to the analysis of the previous section is that in the nineteenth century,
unskilled workers may not have had the political power to impose CLR over the resistance
of more wealthy and politically powerful groups. As discussed earlier, we believe that the
unions’ political activism may have played an important role, despite the lack of universal
suffrage. In this section, we explore the complementary argument that other groups may have
also beneﬁted from the introduction of CLR. In particular, our analysis has not yet considered
the political preferences of factory owners (capitalists). As pointed out by Galor and Moav
(2003), if capital is complementary to skilled labor, it may be in the capitalists’ interest to
support, and even ﬁnance, policies that foster human capital accumulation. We now show that
this possibility arises naturally in an extension of our model.









This technology implies that, if markets are competitive, the owners of capital K appropriate
a constant share θ of the total output. We assume that there is a constant stock of capital,
which is owned by a separate class of agents. This feature is for simplicity; regardless of
the amount of capital, the total income of capitalists depends on the composite labor input
[αXκ
S +( 1− α)Xκ
U]. Therefore, the political preferences of capitalists would be similar if
capital could be accumulated and responded to changes in its productivity.
We consider the following experiment. We analyze the same transition discussed above to-
wards an expected date at which CLR are introduced. We then calculate the share ofoutput ac-
cruing to the capitalists conditional on the alternative assumptions that CLR are either passed
28or rejected. This comparison would determine the capitalists’ choice if they had the power to
veto CLR.
As Figure 10 shows, conditional on CLR (solid line) there is an initial drop (in period 7) in
the capitalists’ income after the introduction of CLR. This is due to children of large families
being forced out of the labor force. However, this is followed by a recovery triggered by
increasing education and a larger proportion of skilled workers in the population. In contrast,
under no CLR (dashed line) there is no initial drop in output, and the skill ratio does not grow.
Despite the increase in education under CLR, from period 11 onwards there is a clear output
divergence in favor of the economy without CLR. This is due to the fact that fertility is higher
in the long-run under no CLR. Although output per worker is higher in the economy with
CLR, total output is smaller. Since capitalists appropriate a constant share of total output,
their interests are harmed by the introduction of CLR in this example.
The outcome would be different if the increase in the skill bias of the technology were sufﬁ-
ciently large to push the economy to a steady state where all families educate their children
even when CLR are never introduced. In this case, long-run population growth does not de-
pend on the policy, and the income of the capitalists depends only on the relative supply of
the two skills. To illustrate this case, Figure 11 shows the capitalists’ income under the two
policies if α increases to 0.85 instead of 0.65, resulting in a steady state where all families are
small. A similar effect could be reached by a policy that subsidizes education. As before, the
introduction of CLR initially harms the capitalists (solid line) due to the declining supply of
unskilled labor. From the ﬁrst period after the reform onwards, however, the capitalists gain
from CLR due to the higher supply of skilled labor. In the steady state, the two policies yield
the same income for the capitalists. Clearly, the capitalists would prefer CLR in this example,
unless they are very impatient.
The analysis of this section could be further extended by distinguishingdifferent types of cap-
italists who operate different technologies. From a historical perspective, the most important
distinction is the one between land owners and factory owners, who were both politically in-
ﬂuential in the period of the introduction of CLR in Britain (as evidenced by the debates on
the Corn Laws and the Poor Laws). If we assume that land is complementary to child la-
bor, whereas skill-biased technological change leads to complementarity between industrial
capital and skilled labor, a conﬂict of interest between landowners and factory owners arises.
The support for CLR would therefore also depend on the relative political power of these two
groups. It is still the case, however, that skill-biased technological change would increase the
29likelihood of the introduction of CLR.
In summary, this section demonstrates that the same type of technological change that leads
unskilled workers to support CLR may also shift capitalists’ views in favor of CLR. Histor-
ically, we observe little evidence that capitalists actively supported the introduction of CLR,
which is why we put most emphasis on the attitudes of the working class. Nevertheless, even
if capitalists did not literally gain from restrictions, skill-biased technical change could make
capitalists less adamant in their opposition. Changing views of the working class and the
capitalists are therefore complementary explanations for the introduction of CLR.
7 Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to shed light on the political economy of child labor laws. The key
novelty of our model is an interaction between demographic variables (the number of children
per family) and political preferences. While it may seem obvious that whether or not a worker
has working children will inﬂuence opinions about child labor laws, our model shows that
this fact leads to surprising implications. Since children are long-lived, fertility decisions can
lock agents into speciﬁc political preferences. Multiple steady states can then arise, because
CLR induce individual behavior which, in turn, increases the support for maintaining the
restrictions. This “lock-in” effect can explain why we observelarge variations in the incidence
of child labor and child labor laws across countries of similar income levels.
To account for the initial introduction of child labor laws, we extend the model to allow for a
change in the economy which shifts political preferences in favor of CLR. Here, our preferred
explanationistechnologicalprogresswhichraises thereturn toskilledlabor, therebyproviding
incentives for parents to choose small families and educate their children even while child
labor continues to be legal. We concentrate on skill-biased technological change because this
explanation is consistent with evidence on trends in wage inequality in major industrializing
countries in the nineteenth century. However, other factors can trigger a similar transition,
e.g., a fall in the relative productivity of child labor, or exogenous factors affecting fertility
rates.
Our theory can provide some guidance in the debate on the introduction of child labor laws in
developing countries. The model predicts that even in countries where the majority currently
opposes the introduction of CLR, the constituency in favor of these laws may increase over
30time once the restrictions are in place. However, for this to be true two conditions have to
be met. First, if the cost of schooling is too high, poor parents may decide not to send their
children to school even if CLR are in place. Second, if despite the introduction of CLR
children continue to be productive in household or marginal activities, the policy may fail
to reduce fertility and induce the switch from quantity to quality. Everyone, including the
children, might in this case be worse off after CLR have been introduced. CLR are more
likely to be successful, and enjoy increasing political support, if they are accompanied by
policies that reduce the cost or increase the accessibility of schools.
31A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Characterization of Steady States
In this section, we develop conditions under which each of the ﬁve types of steady states
described in Section 3 obtains as an equilibrium. Each steady state prescribes which education
and fertility decisions are optimal for each type of parent. The conditions for a candidate
steady state to be an equilibrium can be checked by computing the steady-state utility that
an agent receives under the prescribed decisions, and then verifying whether the agent could
gain by making other than the prescribed choices. To simplify notation, we introduce average
discounted probabilities,whereΠ
eU,eS
h→h  denotes the average discounted probabilityfor an agent
who is currently of skill level h to have descendants of skill level h . The superscripts denote
whether the skilled and unskilled parents educate their children. These probabilities are given
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We start with the steady state in which all workers educate their children, ˜ η =2 . In this steady
state, xGU = xGS =0and ePU = ePS =1 . Hence, L =0 . The necessary and sufﬁcient
condition for this steady state to be an equilibrium is that, given wages, the unskilled adults
ﬁnd it optimal to educate their children. By Lemma 1, this implies, a fortiori, that the skilled
adults also choose to educate their children. The steady state utility of unskilled adults in the
steady state where all children receive education is given by:
VPU,2 = u(wU,2 − pP)+λβz (π1VPS,2 +( 1− π1)VPU,2)+( 1− λ)βVPU,2,
where Vnh,˜ η denotes the steady-state utility of an agent of family size n and skill h conditional
on ˜ η. A similar notation is used for wages. This equation can be solved and expressed as:
VPU,2 =
u(wU,2 − pP) − Π
1,1
U→S[u(wU,2 − pP) − u(wS,2 − pP)]
1 − β(1 − λ(1 − z))
. (8)
For the candidate steady state to be sustained, deviations must be unproﬁtable, i.e., no agent
can increase her utility by choosing a large family and making her children work. Consider
an unskilled adult who deviates and chooses a large family and child labor. If this deviation
is proﬁtable for the parent, it would also be proﬁtable for a potential unskilled child. We
therefore check a continued deviation of an entire dynasty, i.e., we assume that the parent and
32all future unskilled descendants choose a large family and child labor. The resulting utility is:
VGU,2 =
u(wU,2(1 + Gl)) − Π
0,1
U→S[u(wU,2(1 + Gl)) − u(wS,2 − pP)]
1 − β(1 − λ(1 − z))
.
Comparing VPU,2 and VGU,2, we ﬁnd that the deviation is not proﬁtable as long as
u(wU,2(1 + Gl)) − u(wU,2 − pP) ≤ Π
0,1
U→S [u(wU,2(1 + Gl)) − u(wS,2 − pP)]
− Π
1,1
U→S [u(wU,2 − pP) − u(wS,2 − pP)]. (9)
Note that, since we consider individual deviations, we have held wages constant at the steady
state level. Inequality (9) is a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for a steady state equilibrium
where all agents educate their children (˜ η =2 ) to be sustained.
The steady state where all skilled and some unskilled workers educate their children exists if,
for some ˜ η ∈ (1,2), the skilled and unskilled wages are such that VGU,˜ η = VPU,˜ η, i.e.,
u(wU,˜ η (1 + Gl)) − u(wU,˜ η − pP)=Π
0,1
U→S [u(wU,˜ η (1 + Gl)) − u(wS,˜ η − pP)]
− Π
1,1
U→S [u(wU,˜ η − pP) − u(wS,˜ η − pP)]. (10)
Recall that, by Lemma 1, VGU,˜ η = VPU,˜ η implies that VGS,˜ η <V PS,˜ η. Hence, if the condition
is satisﬁed, skilled adults strictly prefer small families with educated children. Equation (10)
is therefore necessary and sufﬁcient for this type of steady state to exist.
We now move to the steady state where all skilled and no unskilled workers educate their
children, ˜ η =1 . In this steady state, xPU =0 , xGS =0 , eGU =0 ,a n dePS =1 . Hence,
L = lGxGU. Two conditions need to be checked: skilled workers must prefer to educate their
children, and unskilled workers must prefer not to educate. Proceeding as before, we get the
following two conditions:
u(wU,1(1 + Gl)) − u(wU,1 − pP) ≥ Π
0,1
U→S [u(wU,1(1 + Gl)) − u(wS,1 − pP)]
− Π
1,1
U→S [u(wU,1 − pP) − u(wS,1 − pP)], (11)
u(wS,1 + wU,1Gl) − u(wS,1 − pP) ≤ Π
0,0
S→U[u(wS,1 + wU,1Gl) − u(wU,1(1 + Gl))]
− Π
0,1
S→U[u(wS,1 − pP) − u(wU,1(1 + Gl))]. (12)
For our candidate steady state equilibrium to be sustained, both (11) and (12) must hold si-
multaneously.
The next case is that some skilled and no unskilled workers educate their children, ˜ η ∈ (0,1).
33The necessary and sufﬁcient condition for this steady state is:
u(wS,˜ η + wU,˜ ηGl) − u(wS,˜ η − pP)=Π
0,0
S→U[u(wS,˜ η + wU,˜ ηGl) − u(wU,˜ η (1 + Gl))]
− Π
0,1
S→U[u(wS,˜ η − pP) − u(wU,˜ η (1 + Gl))]. (13)
Recall that, by Lemma 1, VGS,˜ η = VPS,˜ η implies that VGU,˜ η >V PU,˜ η. Hence, unskilled adults
strictly prefer large families with working children.
Finally, we turn to the steady state in which none of the children receive education, ˜ η =0 .
The necessary and sufﬁcient condition for this steady state to be an equilibrium is that, given
wages, the skilled adults ﬁnd it optimal not to educate their children. By Lemma 1, this
implies, a fortiori, that the unskilled adults also choose not to educate their children. The
condition is given by:
u(wS,1 + wU,1Gl) − u(wS,1 − pP) ≥ Π
0,0
S→U[u(wS,1 + wU,1Gl) − u(wU,1(1 + Gl))]. (14)
A.2 Statement and Proofs of Lemmas
Lemma 1 In steady state, VGS − VPS <V GU − VPU. Hence:
1. VGS ≥ VPS (ηS > 0) implies that VGU >V PU (ηU =0 ), and
2. VGU ≤ VPU (ηU > 0) implies that VGU <V PU (ηS =1 ).
Proof of Lemma 1: Proving that VGS (Ω) − VPS(Ω) <V GU (Ω) − VPU(Ω) is equivalent to
proving that:
(1 − β (1 − λ)) · (VGS (Ω) − VGU (Ω)) < (1 − β (1 − λ)) · (VPS(Ω) − VPU(Ω)).
From (1), plus being in a steady state (Ω=Ω  ), it follows that:
(1 − β (1 − λ)) · (VGS (Ω) − VGU (Ω)) = u(wS + wUlG) − u(wU + wUlG) <
u(wS − pP) − u(wU − pP)=( 1− β (1 − λ)) · (VPS(Ω) − VPU(Ω))
The last inequality follows from the concavity of the utility function. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 The steady state population growth rate g has the following properties.
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≡ γ (ηU),
34where ψ (ηU) ≡ 1+( 1− ηU)
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≥ 1 , and γ (1) = P. The
population growth rate g is a strictly decreasing function of the fraction ηU of unskilled
adults with small families.
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, γS (0) = G and γS (1) = γ (0). The population
growth rate g is a strictly decreasing function of the fraction ηS of skilled adults with
small families.
Proof of Lemma 2: Deﬁne q ≡ G/P > 1.
Part1: Thelawofmotion(5),togetherwiththerestrictionthatηS =1andxGS,t+1 =0 ,deﬁnes
a system of four equations in four unknowns. The unique solution with nonnegative fractions
of each type yields a solution for the growth rate of the population such that 1+g/λ ≡ γ (ηU),
where γ (ηU) is as deﬁned above. It is useful to note that:
ψ (ηU) ≥ (1 + (1 − ηU)q ((1 − π0) − (1 − π1))) ≡ ˜ ψ(ηU),
with strict inequality for any ηU < 1 (whereas ψ(1) = ˜ ψ(1) = 1), and that ψ  (ηU) <
˜ ψ  (ηU) < 0.N e x t ,d e ﬁ n e :
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≤ γ (ηU),





(1 + (1 − ηU)q (π1 − π0)) +
 
(1 − (1 − ηU)q (π1 − π0))
2
 
= P ≤ γ (ηU).
Thus, λ(P − 1) is alowerbound to thegrowth rateof thepopulation. Notealso that ˜ ψ (ηU)
2−
4q(1 − ηU)(π1 − π0)=( 1− (1 − ηU)q (π1 − π0))
2 > 0, hence, ψ(ηU)
2−4q(1 − ηU)(π1 − π0) >
0, i.e., γ (ηU) ∈ R+.F u r t h e r m o r e ,γ  (ηU) < ˜ γ  (ηU)=0 , proving that g is uniformly decreas-
ing in ηU.
Part 2: The law of motion (5), together with the restriction that η =0and xPU,t+1 =0deﬁnes
a system of four equations in four unknowns. The unique solution with nonnegative fractions
of each typeyieldsa solutionfor thegrowth rateof thepopulationsuch that 1+g/λ ≡ γS (ηS),
where γS (ηS) is as deﬁned above. First, note that the discriminant in the deﬁnition of γS (ηS)
35is positive, since:
ψS (η)
2 − 4qηS (π1 − π0) ≥ (1 + ηSq(π1 − π0))
2 − 4ηSq(π1 − π0)=
(1 − ηSq(π1 − π0))
2 ≥ 0.
Next, observe that:














and, moreover, γ 
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S (ηS). Finally, note that:


































implying that ˜ γ 
S (ηS)=0 . This establishes that γ 
S (ηS) < 0, i.e., g is uniformly decreasing in
ηS. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3 The fraction ξPS of skilled adults with small families is strictly increasing in ηU.
The fraction ξGU of unskilled adults with large families is strictly decreasing in ηS. The ratio
of skilled to unskilled labor supply increases with both ηU and ηS. Hence, the equilibrium
skilled (unskilled) wage decreases (increases) with both ηU and ηS.
Proof of Lemma 3: Once more, the two cases of ηU ∈ (0,1) and ηS ∈ (0,1) are parallel. We
therefore concentrate on the case ηU ∈ (0,1) (which implies ηS =1 ). Using the solution for g
and the deﬁnition of γ (ηU) deﬁned in the proof of Lemma 2, we can solve for the steady state
proportion of each type, as a function of ηU:
ξPU(ηU)=
GηU ((1 − π0) − P (π1 − π0)/γ (ηU))
γ (ηU)+( G − P)ηU +( Gπ0 − Pπ 1)(1− ηU)
,
ξGU (ηU)=
γ (ηU) − P (ηU + π1 (1 − ηU))
γ (ηU)+( G − P)ηU +( Gπ0 − Pπ 1)(1− ηU)
,
ξPS(ηU)=
Gπ0 + GPηU (π1 − π0)/γ (ηU)
γ (ηU)+( G − P)ηU +( Gπ0 − Pπ 1)(1− ηU)
.
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+( π1 − π0)(ηU + π1 (1 − ηU)).
We want to prove that ξ 
PS(ηU) ≥ 0 for all ηU ∈ [0,1]. To this aim, we deﬁne the function:




F (ηU)+( q(1 − π0) − (π1 − π0))
 
˜ ψ (ηU)









2 (1 − π0) − (π1 − π0)
 
+
q(2(π0 (1 − ηU)+ηU)+( 1− π1)(1− ηU))
 
,
w h e r ew eh a v et h a t¯ ξ (ηU) ≥ ˜ ξ (ηU). It is immediate to verify that ˜ ξ (ηU) ≥ 0, with strict
inequality holding whenever π0 <π 1 < 1. Hence, ξ 
PS(ηU) ≥ 0. In fact, ξ 
PS(ηU) > 0
whenever π0 <π 1 < 1. A parallel argument applies to the case ηS ∈ (0,1). It therefore
follows that ratio of skilled to unskilled labor supply increases with both ηU and ηS. Q.E.D.
A.3 Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: We begin by deﬁning the utility differential for unskilled and skilled
adults between having large and small families in steady state:
∆U (˜ η)=VGU,˜ η − VPU,˜ η,
∆S (˜ η)=VGS,˜ η − VPS,˜ η.
According to conditions (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), and (14), a steady state of type ˜ η =2
exists if ∆U(2) ≤ 0, type ˜ η ∈ (1,2) exists if ∆U(˜ η)=0for some ˜ η ∈ (1,2), type ˜ η =1
exists if ∆U(˜ η) ≥ 0 and ∆S(˜ η) ≤ 0, type ˜ η ∈ (0,1) exists if ∆S(˜ η)=0for some ˜ η ∈ (0,1),
and, ﬁnally, type ˜ η =0exists if ∆S(0) ≥ 0. A unique steady state therefore exists if ∆U (˜ η)
and ∆S (˜ η) are strictly monotonically increasing in ˜ η. Given that Lemma 3 establishes that the
wage premium is strictly decreasing in ˜ η, for the skilled adults this monotonicityis immediate.
Thesituationismorecomplicatedfortheunskilledadults,sincetherearetwoopposingeffects:
as theskillpremiumrises,educationbecomes moreattractive,butalso lessaffordable. Writing
37steady state utilities for unskilled adults as a function of ˜ η we get:
VGU,˜ η =
u(wU,˜ η (1 + Gl)) − Π
0,1
U→S (u(wU,˜ η (1 + Gl)) − u(wS,˜ η − pP))
1 − β (1 − λ(1 − z))
,
VPU,˜ η =
u(wU,˜ η − pP) − Π
1,1
U→S[u(wU,˜ η − pP) − u(wS,˜ η − pP)]
1 − β(1 − λ(1 − z))
.






1 − β(1 − λ(1 − z))
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U,˜ η > 0, w 




U→S > 0. It therefore sufﬁces to show that:
u






(1 + Gl) >u















u (wU,˜ η − pP)
u (wU,˜ η(1 + Gl)))
.
Under CRRA, the right-hand side is increasing in the wage and, therefore, Assumption 2 is a
sufﬁcient condition for a unique steady state to exist. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: To begin, set β =0(to be relaxed later), choose an arbitrary G>0,
and choose λ>0, π0 > 0,a n dπ1 >π 0 such that the old unskilled are always in majority
(i.e., (1−λ)(1−π1) > 0.5), which satisﬁes the ﬁrst condition in the proposition. Since given
β =0the future is not valued, there is no incentive for education. Therefore without CLR, for
any positive values of the remaining parameters p and P the steady state with ˜ η =0prevails
(all families are large), satisfying the second part of the proposition. Conversely, when CLR
are in place (combined with a compulsory education policy) the steady state is ˜ η =2 ,a sa l l
families are small to economize on the educational cost.
We still need to show that we can choose p and P such that both CLR and no CLR are SSPE,
and that the assumption β =0can be relaxed. First, assume that the steady state without CLR
prevails. We want to ﬁnd conditions such that the (old unskilled) majority would oppose CLR




1 − π0 + Gl
,
and the corresponding unskilled wage is wU,0 = f(x0) − f (x0)x0. If CLR are introduced, all





and the corresponding wage ˜ wU,0 = f(˜ x0) − f (˜ x0)˜ x0 satisﬁes wU,0 < ˜ wU,0.H o w e v e r , t h e
unskilled workers also lose child labor income and have to pay the schooling cost. The old
unskilled majority oppose CLR if their consumption is lower under CLR, i.e., if:
wU,0(1 + Gl) > ˜ wU,0 − pG
is satisﬁed. Clearly, the education cost p can always be chosen sufﬁciently high such that
the majority of unskilled agents opposes the introduction of CLR. Also notice that the small
family size P has not entered any equations yet; we are free to choose P independently to
meet the ﬁnal condition in the proposition.
Now consider the case where currently the steady state with CLR prevails. We want to ﬁnd
conditions under which the (old unskilled) majority would prefer to keep CLR in place. In the





and the corresponding unskilled wage is wU,2 = f(x2) − f (x2)x2. If CLR are abandoned, all
children will enter the labor market, and young families will choose the large family size G.
The ensuing skill ratio is:
˜ x2 =
π1
1 − π1 +( 1− λ)Pl+ λGl
,
and the corresponding wage ˜ wU,2 = f(˜ x2)−f (˜ x2)˜ x2 satisﬁes ˜ wU,2 <w U,2. The old unskilled
will prefer to maintain CLR if their consumption falls if CLR are abandoned, i.e.:
wU,2 − pP > ˜ wU,2(1 + Pl).
This condition can be satisﬁed by choosing P sufﬁciently small. Notice that ˜ wU,2 does not
converge to wU,2 as P goes to zero, because the young adults choose the large family size G.
By choosing P, we can therefore ensure that the majority prefers to keep CLR in place. We
have therefore found a set of parameters for which multiple SSPE exist. Finally, since utility
is continuous in β, the same result can be obtained for positive β, sufﬁciently close to zero,
and the same remaining parameters. Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: Uniqueness of Steady States with Fixed PoliciesFigure 2: ˜ η in Steady State as a Function of Skill Bias α
























































Figure 5: Skill Premium in the Model under Endogenous Policy (Solid) and without CLR
(Dashed)Figure 6: Population Growth in the Model under Endogenous Policy (Solid) and without CLR
(Dashed)















































Figure 7: Fraction of Children Working in the Model under Endogenous Policy (Solid) and





































































Figure 9: Schooling Rates (Percentage of Children Aged 5–14 in School) and Child Labor
Rates (Percentage of Children Aged 10–14 Economically Active) in the U.K.Figure 10: Capitalists’ Income in the Baseline Model under Endogenous Policy (Solid) and
without CLR (Dashed)











































Figure 11: Capitalists’ Income in the Model with Larger Increase in Skill Bias under Endoge-
nous Policy (Solid) and without CLR (Dashed)